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Abstract: The paper aims to evaluate the direct and indirect determinants of the system for administrative legal 
protection efficiency in the Republic of North Macedonia. For this purpose, the paper analyzes the legal and 
institutional framework of administrative authorities i.e. the second instance administrative commissions that act 
on the appeal against the decisions of the first instance administrative bodies, as well as the legal and institutional 
framework of the Administrative and Higher Administrative Court that provide administrative-judicial protection 
against administrative acts. The paper assesses internal efficiency determinants for three second instance state 
commissions that provide legal protection in administrative procedure in the country, independently, as well as the 
two administrative courts: staff (administrative staff, number of elected members of second instance commissions, 
number of judges), number of newly formed cases, number of resolved cases and number of unresolved cases at 
the end of a year.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Authorities conducting administrative procedures, decision makers on administrative 
matters are obligated to secure successful and quality provision of civil rights, legal interests 
and duties before the state to all parties in i.e. citizens and businesses. Understanding 
efficiency as a specific reflex of the principle of legality, legal protection against infringement 
on the former is considered violation of the latter. This means that parties in administrative 
procedures and administrative dispute are provided right of objection, appeal and law-suit 
when their rights are violated as a resulted of administrative inefficiency in the same capacity 
and legal format provided in any other administrative process. Efficiency is considered by 
many a prime principle of government operation, very much like the principle of 
effectiveness. Efficiency is a measure of how much each unit of input (every effect, result of 
any service) costs (expressed in invested time, manpower and other resources), while 
effectiveness is a measure of quality of such outputs, i.e. how well the desired effect is 
achieved.  
Generally speaking, efficiency may be perceived as a true (real) effect of 
productiveness achieved by execution of specific tasks, assessed by whether intended goals 
were met or not, or whether the expected output from an administrative process is the one 
desired in the moment the process was initiated. In this more generalized context, efficiency 
may include quality, effectiveness, expediency and speed (economics) of administrative work 
(Dimitrijevic 2017, 325). This paper presents the results of observed and measured efficiency 
indicators for the institutions providing legal protection in administrative proceedings in the 
Republic of North Macedonia1, individually per institution as well as aggregated in a panel, 
observed and measured as a single system for provision of administrative legal protection. 
The research‟ goal was to determine direct and indirect predictors of efficiency in the system 
for administrative legal protection in North Macedonia. 
The population or total number of units of observation comprising the system for 
administrative legal protection in North Macedonia is seven public institutions, five of which 
are subject of this research. The period of observation for selected institutions was the 
entirety of their existence since they were established until the end of 2017. Three of these 
institutions are independent state bodies: State Commission for Decision Making in Second 
Instance in Administrative Procedures and Labor Disputes, the State Commission for Decision 
Making in Second Instance Inspection Oversight and State Commission for Appeals in Public 
Procurements. The other two are courts: Administrative Court Skopje and Higher 
Administrative Court. This research does not cover the following ministerial commissions: The 
Commission for Appeals in the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy and the Commission for 
Appeals in the Ministry of Healthcare. 
 
                                                          
1
 Further in the text: North Macedonia. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Nashold and Otter argued in 1996 that government policy must take greater account 
of economic criteria of efficiency and effectiveness. The use of social resources must be 
continuously subject to the requirement that they be employed efficiently and effectively, 
implying both a rise in intra-administrative efficiency and also an economic calculation of 
alternative uses and modes of application (Nashold and Otter 1996, 62). 
Finding a common unit of measurement [however] or as Koprić formulated it a 
„common meter‟ poses a methodological challenge when comparing and determining 
commonalities in administrative systems of different countries (Koprić 2011, 10). The same 
challenges stand when attempting to compare and measure different aspects of operation 
between institutions within the same country. Though differences between administrative 
systems indisputably exist, still certain common traits of internal organization and thus factors 
that affect productiveness i.e. predictors of it can be found and subjected to the same 
working principles. 
Let us take the study by Gomes, Guaimaraes and Akutsu from 2016 when they 
measured the effect that employees have on productiveness of courts in Brazil. Despite 
evident variation in the internal workings between courts from country to country stemming 
from institutional idiosyncrasies, traits of the political systems and contemporary political 
context in the state, even in very similar judicial systems the authors justified studying the 
effects of staff on the productiveness of courts. Their research answers how (if at all) one can 
influence judicial productiveness by employing or dismissing staff (Gomes, Guaimaraes and 
Akutsu 2016, 12).The category „staff‟ in their study included the entire labor force involved in 
judicial proceedings comprising judges and administrative servants. This approach is inclined 
to the general theory of productiveness assuming that efficient allocation of labor and capital 
in an organization has positive effects on the organization‟s productiveness (OECD 2018). 
Technical solutions for comparison of different judicial systems are present in the 
practice of the European Commission‟ EU Judicial Scoreboard, as well the CEPEJ publication 
by the Council of Europe. Both utilize the same efficiency indicators: clearance rate, 
disposition time and backlog (EU Justice Scoreboard 2018, 10-16).All three are accepted as 
applicable efficiency indicators regardless of specifics and internal organization of judicial 
system. From this position we established the assumption that as long the nature of 
productive process is not significantly different between two or more organizations (any 
organization), their productiveness i.e. efficiency can be measured using the same set of 
indicators. In this studies sample, state bodies providing appellative protection in 
administrative procedures and the administrative courts providing legal protection in 
administrative disputes essentially perform a similar/near identical task which is overseeing 
the legality of an individual administrative act being contested before it. The act being 
contested is one made by an administrative authority deciding on civil rights and duties. 
Thus, we argue their performance may be measuring utilizing a same set of indicators on the 
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sample as hole as well by status, hence forming two comparable groups. Statistically 
significant differences in the productivity of each group (if any exist) may be ascribed to the 
specifics of internal organization, as well as external factors such as the legal framework 
conditioning each group of institutions to different regime of operating. State bodies are in 
essence administrative organizations and as such subjected to general administrative 
procedure, characterized by prescribed (fixed) deadlines. Administrative courts do not have 
an explicit deadline in which they must process a case and reach a verdict (with exception to 
cases related to elections, misdemeanor or other urgent cases), however judges are given a 
monthly quota expressed in a number of minimum cases each judge must resolve in every 
month. Other external factors of productivity specific to each institution, which are not 
quantitatively described in this study but were noted during interviews by staff working in the 
observed institutions include: working conditions, the quality of intra-institutional 
communications, do institutions deliver cases between them-selves quickly and without errors 
in documentation, ICT and other equipment at their disposal etc. (Gocevski 2017, 45, 47, 50, 
69, 73). 
The working hypothesis (H) is that institutional efficiency (dependent variables Y1, Y2, 
Y3 per individual institution) achieved through adequate allocation of labor and resources 
affects systemic efficiency (regression coefficient for each Y in a multivariate linear regression, 
of X1 and X2 explain a larger variance in the value of Y, i.e. is greater than 0.5, and probability 
that beta coefficients for X1 and X2 are chance results is low enough, i.e. p<0.05). 
A null Hypothesis would be that institutional efficiency cannot be explained in 
meaningful and significant way by the independent variables, nor can the systemic efficiency 
be explained in a meaningful and significant way by X1 and X2 of each institution, per year 
and placed in a panel regression (expected R2 for X1 and X2 is below .05, or the probability 
that beta coefficients for X1 and X2 are chance results is too high, i.e. p>0.05). 
The adequacy of internal allocation of staff and resources is explained by the amount 
of work per institution, per number of staff, for each observed year (explanatory variables). 
Other factors such as the level of ICT utilization, quality of inter-institutional communication 
channels have an intervening effect acting as moderators of systemic efficiency (Intervening 
variables) and thus explain some of the value (or variance in values) of performance 
indicators (Y1, Y2, Y3).2  
Research questions set are:  
Rq1: Do the independent variables in this research affect institutional efficiency equally 
and in a consistent manner regardless of the type of institution? 
Rq2: Does the presence of prescribed deadlines or quotas per employee affect 
institutional efficiency differently? 
 
 
                                                          
2
 More on institutional productivity, with similar variables: Gomes at all, 2016, Lindsay and McQuaid 2008; Quist 2016. 
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Independent (X) and explanatory (е) variables:  
 
Х1, number of decision makers: judges in courts, members of commissions 
Х2, number of administrative servants 
е1, number of administrative servants per decision maker 
е2, number of newly formed cases 
е3, backlog  (stock of unresolved cases) at the end of the previous year 
е4, number of cases solved in the current year 
е5, unresolved cases at the end of the current year 
е6, total number of cases in the current year 
е7, workload per decision maker 
е8, workload per administrative servant 
 
 
Moderator (Int) and dependent (Y) variables: 
 
Y1, Clearance rate (е4/е2) [selected variable in testing] 
Y2, Disposition time (е5/е4*365) [not tested] 
Y3, Backlog (е5/population of RNM *100) [not tested] 
Int – qualitatively obtained information, not present in the quantitative analysis: working 
conditions, quality of inter-institutional communication, regularity of delivered documents 
from one institution to another) etc. 
  
 
X1, X2 e Int  Y 
Hypothesis diagram 
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OVERVIEW OF OBSERVED POPULATION 
 
State Commission for Appeals in Public Procurements 
 
State Commission for Appeals in Public Procurements was established 2007 and 
began operating in 2008 as an independent state body. The same status applies to the two 
other commissions observed in this study. The Commission is composed of a president and 
four members elected by the national assembly to a five-year mandate. It is competent to 
decide on appeals in public procurement procedures, against administrative decisions to 
awarded public procurement contracts, concessions, and public private partnership. Public 
procurement procedures are considered a special type of administrative procedures. Legal 
protection is provided in all phases of the process, from publication of the call for bids to the 
award of contract.3 The commission is obligated with a prescribed deadline to decide within 
15 days of forming a case, by decision in the form of an „individual administrative act‟.4 Said 
decision is considered final but not conclusive, meaning that a dissatisfied party no longer 
has any legal remedies in administrative procedure but is however permitted to initiate an 
administrative dispute, before an administrative court of first instance. The courts‟ verdict can 
then be appealed before the Higher Administrative Court. Administrative disputes are 
considered judicial proceedings, and when deciding on public procurement cases 
proceedings are considered urgent.  
 
Table 1: State Commission for Appeals in Public Procurements  
 
 
                                                          
3
Before this Commission was established, dissatisfied parties in public procurement procedures known as economic 
operators, could contest the decision to elect a most favorable by appealing to a second instance commission formed within 
the Government of the state, see: Gocevski 2017, 25. 
4
Art. 224 para. 6 Law on Public Procurements (Official Gazette of RM no. 136/2007, 130/2008, 97/2010, 53/2011, 185/2011). 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Members of the Commission 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Administrative Servants 5 5 6 8 9 9 10 15 13 12 
Cases from Previous year 0 48 48 48 24 24 28 16 16 17 
Newly formed cases 530 1044 820 642 561 509 563 610 607 544 
Total workload (total cases being processed) 530 1092 868 690 585 533 591 626 623 561 
Solved 482 996 820 666 561 505 575 610 606 548 
Unsolved 48 48 48 24 24 28 16 16 17 13 
Disposition time 36.3 17.6 21.4 13.2 15.6 20.2 10.2 9.6 10.2 8.7 
Clearance rate 0.9 1.0 1.00 1.04 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.01 
Back log. Rate of unsolved cases per 100 out of the 
total population 
0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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State Commission for Decision Making in  
Second Instance Administrative Procedure and Labor Disputes 
 
The State Commission for Decision Making in Second Instance Administrative 
Procedure and Labor Disputes (Akimovska Maletic and Dimitrijevic 2015, 493-494)5 is an 
independent state body. Its composition includes a president and ten members elected and dissolved 
by the national assembly, upon nomination by the Committee for Elections and Appointments to a five-
year mandate. The competence of this commission extends to deciding on appeals against first 
instance administrative decisions made by ministries, other state bodies of administration, 
organizations with public competencies and other bodies of state; and deciding on appeals 
against decisions made in labor disputes between public institutions as employers and their 
employees with the status of public sector employees [except employees with the status of 
administrative servants, who realize this right before another body of state, the Agency for 
Administration];deciding on appeals against reward abolishment acts by the Ministry of 
Interior; and deciding on appeals against first instance decisions by the Securities 
Commission. 
Regarding labor disputes, the competence of this commission extends to appellative 
protection of employment rights to public service providers, persons with special 
authorization and logistical staff in large variety of public institutions: Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (uniformed and civilian personnel), the Army, prison police, public healthcare 
institutions etc. The only administrative servants that protect their employment rights before 
this body are those employed in the Agency for Administration, which is in fact competent to 
provide appellative protection to all other administrative servants.  
The full administrative competencies of this commission are derived from over 150 
laws governing special administrative procedures: pension and invalid insurance, education, 
culture, transport and connections, legalizing infrastructure and buildings [unlawfully 
constructed], privatizing construction land etc.6 Before the commission was established, this 
competence was vested in various appellative commissions within the Government of the 
state (Gocevski 2017, 30). This commission is obligated with a prescribed general deadline, to 
decide within two months of receiving an appeal, unless otherwise mandated by a special law to 
decide within a shorter deadline. When deciding upon an appeal against brought against a 
decision once nullified in a previous proceeding, the commission is obligated to decide in full 
competence i.e. merit and resolve the case in full. The administrative decisions [considered 
second instance] by this commission are considered final but not conclusive and may be 
contested in administrative dispute before an Administrative court of first instance. Decisions the 
commission makes in labor disputes may be contested before a civil labor court.  
                                                          
5
State Commission was established with the Law on Establishment of the State Commission for Decision Making in Second 
Instance Administrative Procedure and Labor Disputes(Official Gazette of RM no. 51/11, 148/13, 41/14, 130/14, 53/2016 and 
11/2018). 
6
From 2014 to 2015 it was competent to decide in second instance procedures of inspection oversight. 
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Table 2: State Commission for Decision Making in Second Instance Administrative Procedures and Employment 
Disputes 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Members of the Commission 7 7 11 11 11 11 
Administrative Servants 22 25 49 53 48 65 
Cases from Previous year   3539 3727 1763 1425 791 
Newly formed cases 11472 7147 5427 4667 4883 3921 
Total workload (total cases being processed) 11472 7264 8365 6064 5517 4756 
Solved 8619 3725 4104 4171 4092 4408 
Unsolved 2853 3422 1323 496 791 754 
Disposition time 120.8 335.3 117.7 43.4 70.6 62.4 
Clearance rate 0.75 0.52 0.76 0.89 0.84 1.12 
Back log. Rate of unsolved cases per 100 out of the total population 0.14 0.17 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.04 
 
 
State Commission for Decision Making in  
Second Instance Inspection Oversight and Misdemeanors 
 
The State Commission for Decision Making in Second Instance Inspection Oversight 
and Misdemeanors was established in 2015,7as an independent state body. Its composition 
includes a president and six members elected and dissolved by the national assembly for a 
mandate of five years. These commissions‟ competencies extend to deciding on appeals 
against administrative decisions made in first instance inspection oversight; and on appeals 
against administrative decisions on misdemeanors made by [first instance] misdemeanor 
authorities. It has a prescribed deadline to decide within two months of receiving an appeal. 
Just as the previous commission (see 3.2) when deciding on an appeal brought against a 
decision, once nullified in a previous proceeding it must resolve the case in full merit.  
The commissions‟ decisions are considered [second instance administrative] final but 
not conclusive and may be contested in administrative dispute before an Administrative court 
of first instance, followed by the right of appeal before the Higher Administrative Court. The 
plaintiff‟s lawsuit does not postpone enforcement of the commissions‟ decision.8 
  
 
 
                                                          
7
Law on Establishment of the State Commission for Decision Making in Second Instance Inspection Oversight and 
Misdemeanors (Official Gazette of RM no. 130/2014, 53/2016 and 11/2018). Decisions of the Constitutional Court of RM: U. br. 
127/2014, September 30
th,
 2015, published in „Official Gazette of RM no. 183/2015 and U. br. 63/2017 са 20. June 20
th,
 2018, 
published in „Official Gazette of RM no. 122/2018. 
8
Art. 9, point. 6 and point. 7 and Art. 11, Law on Establishment of the State Commission for Decision Making in Second 
Instance Inspection Oversight and Misdemeanors. 
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Table 3: State Commission for Decision Making in Second Instance Inspection Oversight and Misdemeanor 
 
 
2016 2017 
Members of the Commission 7 7 
Administrative Servants 27 31 
Cases from Previous year 349 901 
Newly formed cases 3589 3170 
Total workload (total cases being processed) 3938 4071 
Solved 3037 2903 
Unsolved 901 1092 
Disposition time 108.29 137.30 
Clearance rate 0.85 0.92 
Back log. Rate of unsolved cases per 100 out of the total population 0.04 0.05 
 
 
Administrative Court and Higher Administrative Court 
 
Formally the right to administrative dispute was introduced in Macedonian law during 
the early 1970s under the Supreme Court‟s jurisdiction however specialized judiciary was 
introduced in North Macedonia by a constitutional amendment (XXV) in 2005, providing that 
judicial power in the country be exercised by courts that are independent and autonomous.9 
The constitution [base text] did not however prescribe the variety of courts, their types, and 
scope of competence, internal organization and procedures for operation. These issues were 
left to be determined by an organic law. Constitutional guarantees for legal protection were 
further operationalized by the Law on General Administrative Procedure, several sectoral 
Laws and Law on Administrative Disputes (Davkova and Deskoska 2017, 220). 
The latter prescribes that administrative disputes be resolved before the 
Administrative Court, the Higher Administrative Court and the Supreme Court of [North] 
Macedonia.10 The Administrative Court is a court of first instance, deciding on lawsuits against 
final (non-conclusive) administrative decisions by state funds, public enterprises, public 
institutions, organizations and communities with public competencies that sign administrative 
contracts, decisions by municipal mayors when deciding on administrative matters and signs 
administrative contracts. 
 
 
                                                          
9
 The country carried the name North Macedonia from February 2019. From 1991 to 2019 the country bore the name Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia internationally, and internally it was called just Republic of Macedonia. Before 1991, the 
countries name was Socialist Federal Republic of Macedonia as a member republic of the Yugoslav federation, and for a 
brief period in after world war two it was self-declared the Peoples Republic of Macedonia. 
10
 Law on Administrative Disputes (Official Gazette of RM no. 62/2006 and 150/2010). 
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Table 4: Administrative Court 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Judges 22 25 25 30 30 32 29 29 29 29 
Court Servants 33 50 47 44 45 55 58 58 58 58 
Cases from Previous year 5804 9154 10340 13866 15980 14228 12461 9786 9090 9156 
Newly formed cases 8497 9043 9792 11768 14675 12754 13585 15011 13240 11306 
Total workload (total cases being processed) 14301 18197 20132 25726 30591 26907 26138 25681 22978 20462 
Solved 5147 7857 6322 9746 16363 14544 15395 15895 13888 12858 
Unsolved 9154 10340 13810 15980 14228 12461 10743 10734 9786 7604 
Disposition time 649.2 480.3 797.3 598.5 317.4 312.7 254.7 246.5 257.2 215.9 
Clearance rate 0.61 0.87 0.65 0.83 1.12 1.14 1.13 1.06 1.05 1.14 
Back log. Rate of unsolved cases per 100 out of 
the total population 0.45 0.51 0.68 0.79 0.70 0.62 0.53 0.53 0.48 0.38 
 
The Higher Administrative Court is a second instance or appellative court, deciding 
upon appeals against verdicts made by the Administrative court in first instance. The 
Supreme Court has a special competence only for extraordinary legal instruments, against 
verdicts of the Higher Administrative Court.11  
The number of judges in the administrative courts is determined by Judicial Council of 
North Macedonia. In first instance, administrative disputes are carried out by an individual 
judge or judicial council of three judges. Ordinarily, most cases are adjudicated in council. An 
individual judge resides over misdemeanor cases, which are sanctioned by fines lower than 
5.00 euro, as well as misdemeanors for which do not include confiscation of items, 
prohibition of professional conduct and ban of working permission.  
The Higher Administrative Court resides in judicial councils of three judges.12 Both 
courts are issued monthly quotas as minimal required number of resolved cases per judge 
for one month, by the Judicial Council. Between 2008 and 2016 the monthly quota for a 
judge in the Administrative Court ranged from 30 to 43 cases, while the quota for judges in 
the Higher Administrative Court varied around 22 cases per month (Gocevski 2017, 45). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Higher Administrative Court 
                                                          
11
Art. 16 and Art. 17. 
12
Art. 18, 18-а, 188-б, 18-в, 18-г. 
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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Judges 14 12 11 11 11 13 12 
Court Servants 10 11 13 14 13 13 13 
Cases from Previous year / 5 40 87 82 1095 990 
Newly formed cases 55 1750 1982 3948 4349 4388 5452 
Total workload (total cases being processed) 55 1755 2022 4035 4431 5483 6442 
Solved 50 1715 1935 3953 3336 4492 5692 
Unsolved 5 40 87 82 82 990 750 
Disposition time 36.5 8.5 16.4 7.6 9.0 80.4 48.1 
Clearance rate 0.91 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.77 1.02 1.04 
Back log. Rate of unsolved cases per 100 out of the total population 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This research was performed using a mixed method approach, by accessing to and 
processing quantitative and qualitative data sources (Barakso, Sabet and Schaffner 2014, 87, 
88, 190, 110, 112). The obtained quantitative data was recorded as interval data consisting of 
both integers and floating points (continuous data) expressed as: number of employees, 
number of cases and derived efficiency rates. The qualitative data was obtained from: 
statements recorded during interviews, analyzing documented data by the observed 
institutions (InDesk). 
A unit of observation in the research was the performance of each institution in one 
year (country-year observation), with the available staff and workload during that year, 
effectively representing a cross-sectional analysis for several years. All institutions were 
observed for the entirety of their existence since they were established/began operation until 
the end of 2018. All units of observation were monitored for the same parameters, 
throughout time thus combining longitudinal data with cross-sectional data into a time series 
data i.e. also known as a panel study. 
The effect of intervening variables, on the amount of influence employees have on 
institutional performance indicators was tested by grouping the observed institutions by 
status (courts and state commissions, as each is governed by a different legal regime while 
both in essence oversee the legality of administrative decisions), and looking for statistically 
significant differences in the performance indicators of the two groups. 
Techniques used for quantitative data processing are fixed-effect panel data 
estimation (or multivariate linear „panel‟ regression) and a means comparison using an 
independent sample t-test (Moore 2000, 390, 401, 406). 
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RESULTS FROM STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Fixed Effects Panel Estimation Results 
 
Units of analysis are the five institutions. Rather than to look at differences between 
the 5 institutions at a particular year, the fixed-effects panel data estimation looks at 
differences within these institutions over time. This way we also attempt to avoid risk of 
reverse causality in our inferences (Barakso, Sabet and Schaffner 2014, 171-172; Moore 2000). 
The number of observations may seem small for a panel regression analysis, however in this 
particular study they represent the entire population for a time series, encompassing both 
longitudinal and cross-sectional data, and not a sample size. Both panel results were tested 
for robustness to ensure consistent results in the inferred relationship between the 
independent variables (x1-decisionmakers and x2-servants) and the tested dependent 
variable (Y1-clearance rate) regardless of other factors or specifics of the model. 
A static panel fixed effect model of the clearance rate - presented in Table 6 -
demonstrates that staff, both decision makers (x1, β=0.034, p=0.012) and servants (x2 
β=0.007, p=0.002) in all five institutions are significant predictors of clearance rates (Y1) and 
the regression coefficient explain 65% (R2 = 0.65) of the variance in clearance rates. The 
remaining 35% of the variance we deduce can be explained by other factors, not directly 
observable from our study, but confirmed by data obtained via interviews and at premise 
survey of premises.  
 
Table 6: Fixed Effect Clearance Rate x1 x2  
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We also use a dynamic panel data approach, which considers the influence of 
previous years to the performance and behavior of organizations. As presented in Table 7, 
the coefficient on the staff has higher statistical significance that decision makers (x1 β= 0.4, 
p=0.002) and servants (x2 β=0.009, p=0.001) are predictors of clearance rates (Y1). The 
independent variables in the model explain 72.5% (R2=0.725) of variance in clearance rates, 
leaving less than 30% of the variance to be explained by other factors. We assume the 
remaining variance can be explained by the factors expressed by judges, commission 
members and administrative servants during interviews such as working conditions, the 
quality of intra-institutional communications, do institutions deliver cases between them-
selves quickly and without errors in documentation, ICT and other equipment at their 
disposal but we cannot test the individual effect of each aforementioned factor, hence they 
cumulative represent a deduced value as an intervening variable. 
 
Table 7: Fixed Effect Clearance to X1 X2 Clearance Lagged From Previous 
 
 
 
What this means is that more staff will affect positively performance indicators but not 
by much, and not on long term. Other measures should be taken to improve intra 
institutional and inter-institutional communication. When interpreting these results, one must 
consider inherent risks every causal inference confronts in a large N study using cross-
sectional data. We acknowledge two sources of potential endogeneity: possible reverse 
causality and omitted variable bias (Stojkov 2009, 72-75).  
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This study attempts to address the problem of the omitted variable bias by including 
as many possible external factors which may affect productivity, expressed as meaningful by 
judges, commission members and administrative servants employed in each of the observed 
institutions in the sample. We also try to avoid stepping into the reversed causal inference 
trap (as a separate source of endogeneity) by carefully formulating a hypothesis which 
explains whether the number of employees affects productiveness expressed by Y1-clearance 
rate, and how much of the variance in clearance rates are explained by the independent 
variables. Both diagrams show that x1 and x2 do explain a large share of clearance rates – we 
attribute the remaining share of variance in Y1 to other factors. We also do not reject a 
possible and very probable explanation that faced with increasing workloads resulting with a 
decrease of productivity indicators institutions did in fact increase the number of staff thus 
acting reactively. But we do strongly support the claim that productivity is not necessarily 
increased only by employing new staff- but rather a meaningful degree of productivity can 
be achieved by improving working conditions, inter-institutional communication, 
digitalization of document management within and between institutions etc. We also support 
the claim that institutions adapt to their workload over time.  
In times of excess workloads they can increase working hours, or monthly quotas, 
while in periods of decreased workloads the decrease the amount of cases per available 
decision maker/team of civil servants or for judges they lower monthly quotas – thus they 
may exhibit similar clearance rates regardless of actual workload, even though they are 
spending more on salaries and (cumulatively) doing less. It is only in significant drops in 
clearance rates and increase in backlogs that one may support additional staffing.  
 
Means Comparison between State Commissions and  
Administrative Courts Performance Indicators (independent sample t-tests) 
 
Comparing mean values for select performance indicators for statistically significant 
differences (*p<.05, **p<.01)13 between courts and state bodies that provide legal protection 
in administrative procedures in North Macedonia, we obtained results for six parameters in 
the observed institutions (Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Means Comparison of Performance Indicators  
 Courts Commissions 
Clearance Rate 0.96 0.92 
Workload per decision maker 597.86 411.45 
Disposition time 254.62** 65.37** 
Average solved cases in one year 8187.53** 2301.56** 
Number of servants per decision maker 1.49** 2,94** 
Workload per servant 380.08** 135.42** 
 
                                                          
13
 If there is no star, differences are not considered statistically significant. 
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Table 9: Clearance Rate 
  Courts Commissions 
Mean 0.96 0.92 
Variance 0.03 0.02 
Observations 17.00 18.00 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00 
 df 31.00 
 t Stat 0.72 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.24 
 t Critical one-tail 1.70 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.48 
 t Critical two-tail 2.04   
   
Table 10: 
 
Disposition Time 
  Courts Commissions 
Mean 254.62 64.37 
Variance 61958.97 6524.16 
Observations 17.00 18.00 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00 
 df 19.00 
 t Stat 3.01 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.00 
 t Critical one-tail 1.73 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.01 
 t Critical two-tail 2.09   
 
Table 11: Workload per decision maker 
  Judges Members of Commissions 
Mean 597.86 411.45 
Variance 89487.88 169514.20 
Observations 17.00 18.00 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00 
 df 31.00 
 t Stat 1.54 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.07 
 t Critical one-tail 1.70 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.13 
 t Critical two-tail 2.04   
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Table 12: Resolved Cases 
  Judges Commissions 
Mean 8187.53 2301.56 
Variance 31045491.26 5009412.50 
Observations 17.00 18.00 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00 
 df 21.00 
 t Stat 4.06 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.00 
 t Critical one-tail 1.72 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00 
 t Critical two-tail 2.08   
 
 
 
Table 13: 
Number of servants per decision 
maker 
  Courts Commissions 
Mean 1.49 2.94 
Variance 0.20 2.14 
Observations 17.00 18.00 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00 
 df 20.00 
 t Stat -4.01 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.00 
 t Critical one-tail 1.72 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00 
 t Critical two-tail 2.09   
 
 
Clearly courts have a larger volume of work compared to any one commission. This is 
a systemic consequence and has little to do with the commissions themselves. There is only 
one first instance administrative court and one second instance administrative court 
competent to reside over all administrative disputes. The Higher Administrative Court resides 
over all appeals against the first instance court verdicts. Second instance decision making i.e. 
appellative protection in administrative procedures is functionally decentralized between 
three state bodies (the observed commissions) and two ministerial commissions (not 
observed in this study) so it‟s no wonder said bodies have a smaller volume of work 
individually. However, the visible differences in volume of work do not significantly affect 
productiveness, which is deduced from the fact that there is no significant difference in the 
clearance rates between the two groups of institutions.  
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A proposed explanation for this is that all institutions after a period adapt to their 
workload and working conditions (in North Macedonia) to achieve a satisfactory [after a while 
similar between observed institutions] level of efficiency. 
An expected discrepancy between disposition times is also evident for the two groups. 
Understandably, state bodies are subject to prescribed deadlines and they apparently do as 
the mean value for their dispositions close to the longest prescribed deadline of 60 days, 
because this deadline applies to a largest number of cases. Administrative courts resolve a 
case between 8 and 9 months. The volume of work per judge however is not significantly 
different from the number of cases per member of commission. The mean values for 
workloads per decision maker are visibly different between the two groups, however due to 
their large internal variance (the difference from the smallest workload per judge and the 
smallest workload per member of commission is too wide from their largest values) we derive 
that this mean number is circumstantial in both cases – a result obtained by chance, which 
may significantly change if the circumstances change even slightly. 
It is evident that judges in administrative courts have fewer administrative servants at 
their disposal to aid in processing cases, a circumstance we consider meaningful because it 
inhibits judicial productivity, and thus we predict that an increase in administrative staff 
directly assisting case processing will positively affect productivity more significantly than an 
increase in the number of judges. 
Although administrative servants in commissions are encumbered by a lower 
workload per servant than court servants, we still deduce a similar conclusion. A higher 
number of administrative servants involved in case processing will affect the commissions 
productivity better (if internally allocated rationally) than an increase if the number of 
commission members. However, the impact increasing administrative staff in commission we 
expect to be smaller than an increase of court servants will have for judicial performance. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The preferred mechanism to tackle increasing workloads in the observed institutions 
obviously was increasing staff. As more cases were formed and/or residual cases from 
previous years accumulated, commissions and administrative courts hired more people 
(respectively). Having and understanding of the dynamics of administrative legal protection, 
we posit ourselves that institutions do not have an influence to the amount of newly formed 
cases per year as they cannot predict how many dissatisfied parties will object to 
administrative decisions. Nor can the courts precisely anticipate how many lawsuits will be 
made against the second instance decisions made by the commissions covered by this study. 
They can only influence their internal processes and to a limited degree the communication 
they have with other institutions. Thus, they can only find ways to adapt to a rise or drop in 
workloads, which since 2008 appears to be mostly by employment – and to a lesser degree 
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(but difficult to measure accurately) to internal optimizations. We thus infer that the 
institutions covered by this study employ as a reaction not as anticipatory action. 
Employees (decision makers and staff) explain up to 72.5% of the variance in 
productivity in the observed population. Employing new staff will not necessarily improve 
productiveness; on the contrary it might bring it down and rise operating costs. Workload per 
administrative servant is not proportional to the workload per decision maker. The same 
disproportion applies to internal allocation of labor in the observed commissions. A single 
case typically moves through two or more tiers of control meaning that it is processed in 
varies levels by two or more servants, in other words to ensure quality they allocate more 
manpower to (re)do the same cases, before finally it is adopted by the commission members.  
Administrative courts also show the tendency to increase the number of judges with 
rising workloads. However, a rise in the number of staff does not appear to significantly 
follow an increase in clearance rates. Disposition times and backlog show a tendency to 
increase as number of staff increases.  
Complementing these tendencies to panel results we infer that when faced with 
higher workloads, courts hired more judges and servants until productiveness appeared to 
increase to meet the challenge. 
All observed institutions exhibited reactive behavior when faced with increasing 
workloads rather than programmatic and anticipatory. 
Administrative courts undisputedly have larger volumes of work than each 
commission, which is explained by their position and role in the states administrative system. 
Substantially, administrative courts are competent to provide legal protection for [virtually] all 
administrative cases, will commissions are functionally decentralized thus are competent 
provide legal protection in fewer sectors of administrative affairs. Even the commission 
deciding in second instance administrative procedure, with the broadest specter of 
competence deriving from over 150 laws still averages to half the workload of the 
Administrative Court (in first instance), though we must accept that in 2017 the commission 
also had half the staff compared to the court. Pressure affecting the working process in 
commissions comes from prescribed deadlines, thus even though faced with lower workloads 
commission employees are forced to resolve them in determined and significantly shorter 
time frames (15 to 60 days). Administrative judges on other hand are pressed to meet a 
monthly quota. Research however showed that regardless organizational format, internal or 
external factors, after some time (3-4 years) institutions balance out inputs and outputs 
achieving (with more or less success) efficiency. This is seen in positive productivity indicators 
which rise following the first few years of the institutions‟ establishment, and there is no 
significant difference in the performance indicators between courts and commissions. If we 
were to comment contemporary staffing conditions, tendencies could justify employing more 
administrative servants in the administrative court of first instance, however until a 1:1 ratio 
between judges and servants directly involved in case proceedings i.e. 28 judges and 28 
servants, and only then allocating remaining administrative staff to other critical positions we 
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predict administrative judges will rely more on personal capacities rather than on support by 
their administration to resolve cases. Thus it is difficult to with certainty predict the effect one 
more administrative servant may have on court productivity. 
Improving external factors which explain almost 30% of the variance in clearance rates 
remain a general recommendation because they are to a large degree beyond the scope of 
influence by the institutions themselves. Such recommendations include fewer and less 
frequent changes to the legal framework, improving inter-institutional communication 
channels thus speeding up response times between them, digitizing document management 
etc. Possibly, one may recommend physically locating all five institutions within one building 
sharing a single archive.  
In summary, we infer the independent variables affect productivity in the observed 
institutions regardless of their organizational format and specific legal regime. We cannot 
support that external factors affect commission productivity differently than they affect courts. 
Evident differences in operational practices and volume of work are nominal only, 
resulting from circumstance and are not related to the type of organization. Undisputedly, 
the number of employees affects productivity but is not the only affecting factor. Internal 
allocation of labor, internal procedures, quality of internal communication channels [proper 
management] as well as inter-institutional communications contributes to about a third of the 
productivity. 
We firmly claim that the arguments support the working hypothesis (the null 
hypothesis is unsupported) and adequate allocation of labor and workloads resulting in a 
degree of productivity of one institution, also affects overall systemic efficiency in the 
provision of legal protection in administrative affairs in North Macedonia. Argument also 
support the assumption, that properly developed inter-institutional channels expedite 
exchange of documents and their quality, thus minimizing data loss, chance of errors and 
speeds up overall proceedings, hence enabling courts and commissions to execute their tasks 
in case resolution quicker and with more accuracy.  
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